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Abstract 
After nearly a millennium of uninterrupted harmony between the Sinhalese and Muslims in 
Sri Lanka, economic and ethno-religious developments after the 1970s have created an 
atmosphere of communal tension between the two groups. While a new wave of political 
Buddhism with its militant offshoot amongst the Sinhalese and the growth of a rigid Islamic 
orthodoxy amongst the Muslims have provided the ethno-religious  dimension to this tension 
the post-1977 open economy has added an economic dimension to it. The interplay of this 
toxic triad is a reminder of a similar scenario that produced the first Sinhalese-Muslim racial 
riots in the country in 1915. Unlike the first, which occurred in the colonial context, the 
current one, which if not arrested, will not only jeopardize Sinhalese-Muslim harmony  but 
also will result in  adverse consequences in Sri Lanka’s relations with Musllm  countries.             
Introduction 
Sri Lanka is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. The 
pluralist make up of this country was built over a thousand years. 
Islam/Muslims and Buddhism/Sinhalese have coexisted in the island for at 
least since the 8th century CE. For nearly one thousand years this coexistence 
was nothing but harmonious - a nonpareil record in the annals of Asian history. 
The rise of political Buddhism in the guise of Sinhalese-Buddhist national 
consciousness during the 1880s disrupted that harmony in 1915. After 
independence in 1948 however, lessons learnt from 1915, imperatives of 
electoral democratic politics, and ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese and 
Tamils necessitated an alliance of convenience between the Muslims and the 
Sinhalese. That alliance too became tenuous in and after the 1970s. While the 
return of an open market economy in 1977 intensified economic competition 
amongst different ethnic groups, the military victory over the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 produced an aura of triumphalism amongst the 
Sinhalese-Buddhists who, with support from militant elements of the Sangha, 
have become extremely aggressive and hegemonic. On the Muslim side, a 
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wave of ultrareligious orthodoxy propagated by the evangelical Tabigh Jamaat 
(TJ) from the early 1960s and Saudi-backed Wahhabism from the 1980s has 
injected an ideology of universal umma-consciousness and a trend of social 
‘exclusivism’ among many of their followers which runs directly in contrast to 
the indigenization and integration trajectories of the past. The political 
implications of this ‘exclusivism’ in a society grappling with competing ethno-
nationalisms have so far escaped the attention of scholars.        
Political Buddhism with its current militant offshoot is the ‘New Buddhism’ and 
the product of a Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness that developed during the 
British colonial era. It is structured upon an artificially manufactured 
“mythohistory” (Thambiah S.J, 1986) and questionable archaeology and 
cemented with an assumed sense of Sinhalese racial superiority (Jayawardena 
K, 1986; Bartholomeusz, T.J. and de Silva C.R, 1998; Somasundaram D, 2010).  
This, in other words, is the Sri Lankan version of the ‘political abuse of history’ 
referred to by Romila Thapar in the context of Hindutva in India (Panikkar K.N, 
2012). Like political Islam in the Middle East and in other parts of the Muslim 
world, political Buddhism in Sri Lanka depends on an ideology based on “a set 
of systematically fashioned beliefs and symbols of Sinhala Buddhists” 
(Jayawardena K, 1986, p. 137) with its ultimate objective of converting Sri 
Lanka into a Sinhala-Dharmadvipa, in which all non-Sinhalese and non-
Buddhists would become the distant “other”. No wonder that one of the 
former presidents of the country is reported to have called the minorities 
“creepers” (Murari 2012, p.144). This hegemonic ideology, which once existed 
only in the thought-domain of the articulated and politically motivated 
Buddhist elite, has now, since the end of the civil war and through vigorous 
political and religious propaganda, permeated the edifice of the broad 
Sinhalese-Buddhist society - a foretoken to future political and social 
instability.  
On the other hand, orthodox Islam, based on a “literalist-exclusivist” (Safi O, 
2003) discourse of its primary sources namely, the Quran and the sunnah 
(sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad), and indoctrinated by local and 
imported religious functionaries through a multiplicity of Islamic institutions, 
has injected, particularly after the 1970s, a strong umma-consciousness, which 
conceals within this imagined monolithic religious identity the ethnic diversity 
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of the Muslim communit - a move, as one historian argues, “from vague 
initiations of identity and difference to pride in collective membership” 
(Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p.x). The inner dynamics of this umma-
consciousness, with its ritual-oriented religious conservatism has become 
problematic in the face of an ideologically constructed Sinhalese-Buddhist 
consciousness. The open-economy within which these two phenomena 
operate has made Sinhalese-Muslim relations in Sri Lanka even more volatile 
with international implications. What follows is a historical but critical review 
of the ethno-religious and economic complexity that governs Sinhalese-Muslim 
relations in Sri Lanka.   
A Millennium of Buddhist-Muslim Harmony 
The history of Islam and Muslims in Sri Lanka dates back, according to one local 
Muslim scholar, to seventh century CE (Shukri, 1990, p.203). It was neither 
conquest nor conversion but commerce and curiosity that brought the early 
Muslims to the shores of Sarandib, a name bestowed by the Arabs of yore 
upon this fertile island. While an abundance of forest resources, precious 
stones, and spices lured the commercial instincts of Arab and Persian traders, 
the curiosity of sufis or Muslim ascetics and Arab travellers drove them to visit 
Samanalakanda (butterfly-mountain) or popularly known as Adam’s Peak in 
the central highlands where the legendary footprint of Adam, the father of 
humanity, according to Muslim believers, is found. The local Buddhist 
community and their rulers always welcomed these foreigners and allowed 
them, for economic and political reasons, to settle permanently in their 
territory. The Muslims fulfilled the need for a merchant class that was in short 
supply in the largely agricultural economies of the ancient and medieval 
Buddhist kingdoms. “They were a dominant influence”, writes K. M. de Silva, 
an eminent historian of Sri Lanka, “on the island’s international trade in the 
period of the Polonnaruva kings, a position which they retained till the early 
decades of the sixteenth century ...” (de Silva, 1981, p. 72).   With Muslims 
came Islam and the Buddhist rulers allowed the newcomers to practice their 
religion as long as it did not hurt the “religious susceptibilities of the majority 
of the people among whom they lived” (Paranavitana. S, 1959-60, p. 769). A 
spiritual congruence between the simplicity and teachings of the sufis and that 
of the Buddhist monks made each other’s social accommodation less 
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problematic. For example, the saffron dress of the monk and the coarse 
woollen gown of the sufi demonstrated the wearers’ austere living, while the 
Buddhist belief in Nirvana or no self went parallel to the concept of fana or 
annihilation of the ego in Sufism. In a fascinating study on Buddhism and Islam 
on the Silk Road, Johan Elverskog (2010) has meticulously recorded how these 
two religions interacted with each other and cross-fertilized to produce a 
cultural synthesis in South East Asia, in contrast to the popular history of 
conflict between them. The history of Islam in Sri Lanka in the ancient and 
medieval times would also be a fitting laboratory to test Elverskog’s findings.     
As years rolled, Muslim settlements increased in number and from the coastal 
areas they moved to the interior. The Arab Muslims, at times, as in 1238 under  
the reign of Bhuvanekabahu I, were even admitted to the foreign diplomatic 
missions of Buddhist kings. They became an invaluable asset to the local 
monarchs, economically as well as politically, and in establishing international 
contacts particularly with the Islamic Caliphate. In the words of Lorna 
Dewaraja, another reputed historian of the country, “... a group of itinerant 
traders, initially foreign in race, religion and culture became an indispensable 
and integral part of the Sri Lankan society” (Dewaraja, 1994, p.3). Over the 
years and “as a result of intermarriage between them and the local population, 
they became Indo-Arab in ‘ethnic’ character rather than purely Arab” (de Silva, 
1981, p. 91). The erosion of their Arab ethnicity however did not lead to a 
dilution of their Islamic identity.   
Until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century followed by the Dutch in 
the 17th, Muslims in Sri Lanka virtually had no enemies. After comparing their 
status and position with their counterparts in Thailand, Burma, and China, 
Dewaraja finds in Sri Lanka, “a state of peaceful co-existence, unique in an era 
of religious persecution and rivalry ...” (Dewaraja, 1994, p. 14).  With Buddhism 
dominating the spiritual horizon and Hinduism holding second place, Islam, 
with its sufi dimension and rituals, fitted in cosily into the cultural mosaic of 
the island. The Muslims were so popular and prosperous in that 
overwhelmingly Buddhist environment until the entry of the Portuguese kin 
the 16th century that it provoked Emerson Tennent, a British civil servant in 
19th century Sri Lanka, to volunteer the hypothesis that “but for this timely 
appearance of a Christian power in the island, Ceylon, instead of being a 
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possession of the British Crown, might at the present day have been a 
Mohamedan kingdom under the rule of some Arabian adventurer” (Tennent, 
vol.1, p. 633). Incidentally, this supposition is somewhat similar to what 
Edward Gibbon imagined, in a rather panic mood, about Islam in Europe after 
the Battle of Poitiers in 733 (David Levering Lewis, 2008, p.173). 
The integration of Muslims with the local Sinhalese population must have been 
so tightly-knit that it could not prevent the conversion of some Sinhalese to 
Islam. A British intellectual, Reverend James Cordiner who lived in the island 
between 1799 and 1804, observed that “The Cingalese who profess the 
religion of Mahomet appear to be a mixed race” (Cordiner, 1983, vol.1: p 117). 
Whether there were conversions in the reverse direction is not known. 
However, in a country where Buddhism has become synonymous with ethnic 
Sinhalese (Obayasekera, 1979, pp279-313; Victor Ivan, 2009, p.261; 
Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998) Cordiner’s observation demonstrates the 
interreligious fluidity in medieval Sri Lanka.  
During the Portuguese and Dutch rule, between 1505 and 1796, the Sri Lankan 
Muslims suffered economically as well as culturally, more so under the 
Portuguese than under the Dutch. While the monopolization of inland and 
overseas trade by both colonial powers deprived the local Muslims of their 
vital means of economic subsistence, the evangelical spirit of the conquerors 
bent on converting the native souls to Christianity meant a double jeopardy 
and an existential threat to Muslims and Islam. It was at this juncture that the 
Muslims who were living peacefully amongst coastal Buddhists began to move 
to the interior and were warmly received by the Buddhist kings of Kandy. 
Dewaraja’s authoritative account cited above and her work on the Kandyan 
Kingdom (Dewaraja, 1982) once again comes to our aid to assess the rapid 
indigenization of Muslims in the Kandyan territories. Muslim tenants working 
in lands belonged to Buddhist temples, Muslim business acumen harnessed by 
the state to increase its domestic product, and Muslim officials employed in 
various capacities by successive Buddhist kings are unique instances of inter-
religious harmony that prevailed in medieval Sri Lanka. In essence, the 
Buddhist worshipers’ prayer dhammam saranam kachchame (surrender to the 
path of dhamma) found amity and congruence with the Muslim believers’ 
prayer ihdhinassiraatal mustakim (guide us along the straight path).  
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There was, however, one novel development during this period which was to 
play a critical role in Muslim politics in the 19th and 20th centuries. It was the 
transformation of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity from Indo-Arab to Moor, 
thanks to the malevolence of the Portuguese.  The name Moor derives from 
the Latin root mauri which originally referred to the in habitants of the Roman 
province of Mauretania, which included today’s Western Algeria and North-
East Morocco. After the 7th century the Latin mauri through its Spanish 
counterpart moro was employed to denote the followers of Islam who after 
the death of the Prophet Muhammad overran Spain and Morocco. The 
Portuguese bestowed this epithet “indiscriminately upon the Arabs and their 
descendants, whom, in the sixteenth century, they found established as 
traders in every port on the Asian and African coast” (Sir James Emerson 
Tennent, 1860, vol. 1, p. 630). Like the medieval name Saracen, Moor was also 
used by the Christian powers as a sobriquet of denigration and, as Edward Said 
writes, “as a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient” (Edward W. Said, 1991, 
p. 60). Ironically, this appellation, because of political necessity in the 1880s, 
was ennobled by the Muslim elite and became the proud nomenclature of its 
community’s ethnic identity (Ali, 1997). 
In spite of the anti-Muslim policies of the Portuguese and Dutch the cordiality 
and harmony that prevailed between the Buddhists and Muslims continued 
unabated both in the colonised territories of the maritime region as well as in 
the interior of the independent Kandyan Kingdom. With the fall of Kandy to the 
British in 1815 the entire island became a British colony and the economic 
forces of capitalism and urbanization unleashed under the new rulers began to 
create inter and intra-communal social fissures and economic tensions. The 
economic inequities of an unrestrained market economy ultimately brought to 
an end in 1915 a millennium of Buddhist-Muslim harmony.  
Political Buddhism and Growth of Anti-Muslim Sentiments  
Political Buddhism, like political Islam, represents a desire, at least among 
sections of the Buddhist elite, to restructure society and its polity on the 
foundation of Buddhist principles and philosophy. This, as a distinct 
phenomenon and a movement, did not exist in ancient Sri Lanka, because 
Buddhism, since its introduction in 3rd century CE, always had the patronage of 
the Sinhalese monarchs. Even after the fall of the maritime regions to Western 
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Christian powers Buddhism enjoyed state patronage in the Kandyan Kingdom 
until 1815. It was only after the fall of Kandy in that year and with it the entire 
nation to the British that state patronage shifted away from Buddhism towards 
Christianity. With a minority religion enjoying state support the majority 
Buddhists naturally felt discontented at the deprivation of a hereditary 
privilege.   
The anti-Muslim sentiments that developed during the last quarter of the 19th 
century were a bi-product of the Buddhist religious and cultural awakening 
that started in the 1860s primarily as an anti-Christian movement. Historically, 
the first wave of Buddhist revivalism is said to have sprung during the reign of 
Kirti Sri Rajasingha (1739-1781) in the Kandyan Kingdom (Ivan, 2009, p.58). The 
objective of this revivalism was to restore the order of the Sangha, which “had 
dwindled into a nebulous state, devoid of bhikkus with higher ordination and 
no leadership” (Ivan, ibid). However, unlike the 18th century revivalism its 
successor in the 19th was mixed with politics. In both waves, Buddhist monks 
played a dominant role. Weliwita Saranankara Thera in the first and Hikkaduwa 
Sri Sumangala Thera and Weligama Siri Sumangala Thera in the second were 
some of the leading spiritual heads in these movements (Ivan, 2009).  
There were two notable developments in the 19th century as far as the Moors 
were concerned. One was an increase in the arrival of Muslim traders and 
businessmen from the Indian sub-continent who were officially called Coast 
Moors because of their coastal origins in today’s Tamil Nadu, even though not 
all the Indians came from that part. Their entry into Sri Lanka which was largely 
curtailed if not totally prohibited by the Portuguese and Dutch was now made 
easier in the wake of loosening immigration restrictions by the British. The 
growing demands of a plantation economy for wholesale and retail services 
made their arrival timely and profitable. By the end of the 1800s the number of 
Coast Moors, according to census reports, increased from 27,000 in 1801 to 
33,000 in 1911, which was 11 and 12 percent of the total Moor population 
respectively. The second development was a radical transformation of the 
official image of the Moors from negative to positive. Unlike the Portuguese 
and Dutch who were totally inimical towards Islam and negative about the 
Moors, the British on the contrary developed a positive image of this 
community because of the latter’s hereditary commercial traits which the 
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British realised could be harnessed and utilised to the benefit of an evolving 
commercial capitalism. In the official reports and publications for instance, 
while the Moors were popularly portrayed as enterprising, active, 
hardworking, dynamic, and business minded, the Buddhist Sinhalese in 
contrast were pictured as slovenly, indolent, and unenterprising ( Ali, 1987). 
Needless to say, that this subtle exercise in differentiated ethnic imagery was 
another dimension of the colonial policy of divide and rule. 
Simultaneously, within the majority Sinhalese community a different image 
about the Moors gained notoriety in the 19th century, thanks mostly to the 
economic behaviour and religious practices of the recently arrived Coast 
Moors. The opening of Sri Lanka’s interior through a net work of roads and 
railways, the development of Colombo as the administrative and commercial 
capital, and mushrooming of towns and markets in various parts of the island 
created multiple profit-making opportunities for investors, businessmen and 
entrepreneurs. To the traditional Moor businessmen these opportunities 
signalled a boon. Muslim settlements moved closer to the cities and towns and 
sections of their residences operated as shops and store-houses. The ubiquity 
of Muslim peddlers, Muslim tavalam-men (traders who went in convoys of 
pack oxen) and retail shopkeepers in the Sinhalese villages, and the presence 
of Muslim wholesalers in Colombo, stamped the Muslims as a business 
community, which characterization, in spite of its factual inaccuracy, is still 
held as heavenly truth by numerous Sri Lankan scholars, journalists, and 
politicians (Ali, 1980). 
In the meantime and towards the end of the 19th century the profit-maximizing 
behaviour of the Coast Moors who were mostly ‘birds of passage’ and whose 
business establishments penetrated deep into the rural regions added to the 
economic hardship of many Sinhalese villagers, whose economic survival had 
already become precarious because of the unfair competition for natural and 
human resources stemmed from a state sponsored plantation sector. “The 
Mohamedan traders, who come from South-India and return thither when 
they have money by retail trading”, wrote Sir Robert Chalmers, the British 
Governor of Ceylon from 1913-16 to the Secretary of State in London, “have 
always been viewed by the villagers with the feelings entertained at all times 
and in all lands towards transitory aliens who make money out of local 
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peasantry by supplying their wants at ‘the shop’ and frequently securing 
mortgages of the lands of thriftless debtors” (Colonial Office, Cd. 8167). It was 
in this climate of rural economic hardship and indebtedness in an open 
economy that a group of Sri Lankan Buddhist nationalists like David 
Hewawitharana Dharmapala, who was initially brought up in a Christian 
environment but later became an ardent Buddhist and changed his name to 
Anagarika Dharmapala, directed their attack on all foreigners in the country 
including Muslims (Ali, 1881). In the speeches and writings of Dharmapala and 
his coreligionists one can see the seedlings of political Buddhism and the 
emergence of a Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness.    
“The Muhammadan ... is an alien to the Sinhalese by religion, race and 
language. He traces his origin to Arabia, whilst the Sinhalese traces his origin to 
India and Aryan sources ... To the Sinhalese without Buddhism death is 
preferable”, wrote Dharmapala (1965, p. 540). He did not always differentiate 
between the Coast Moors and indigenised Moors.  In one instance he wrote, 
“The Mohammedans”, which included all Muslims, “an alien people ... by 
Shylockian methods became prosperous, like the Jews”. Then with the same 
breadth he targeted the Coast Moors and said, “The alien South Indian 
Mohammedan comes to Ceylon, sees the neglected villager without any 
experience in trade ... and the result is that Mohammedan thrives and the son 
of soil goes to the wall” (Ibid). Even though Dharmapala later denied that he 
ever advocated hatred against the Mohammedans but held them as exemplars 
of “energy, industry, perseverance, usefulness, (and) cleanliness” in contrast to 
“the indolent, ignorant, (and) illiterate Sinhalese villager” (op.cit., p.721), he 
nevertheless warned that “there will always be bad blood between the Moors 
and the Sinhalese” (op.cit., p. 541). The anti-Muslim sentiments expressed by 
him and his co-agitators like Walisinghe Harischandra and Piyadasa Sirisena, 
and which were popularised through Sirisena’s paper Sinhala Jatiya  had taken 
a life of its own in making the Muslims the “far other’.  When the riots started 
in 1915 the distinction between the Coast Moor and the Ceylon Moor began to 
fade away (Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p.120). As a result, a total of 25 Muslims 
were murdered, 189 were injured, 350 houses and 17 mosques were set 
ablaze, and another 50 mosques suffered some sort of structural damage (Ali, 
1981). Even though the riots were “a reflection of economic dislocation, price 
rises and the political ferment of the period” (Jayawardena K, op.cit., p.136) it 
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is undeniable that a politicised and popularised Buddhist consciousness rallied 
the Buddhist masses and set them against the Muslims. “The Tambies”, a 
colloquial reference to the Muslims, “are insulting our nationality and our 
religion. We must harass the Tambies, and they must be driven out of Ceylon” 
was the call of the Buddhist agitators (Quoted in Wickramasinghe N, op.cit., p. 
119).   
Political Buddhism after Independence  
Political Buddhism and Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness, which in the early 
decades of the 20th century acted only as an enabler of national anti-colonial 
and pro-independence struggle grew into a movement of ethno-nationalist 
Buddhist ideology and played a decisive role in competitive party politics of 
post-independent Sri Lanka (Somasundaram, 2010). In this toxic mix of 
ethnicity, religion and politics the involvement of the Sangha in politics 
received institutional blessing from the Declaration of the Vidyalankara Privena 
in February 1946. This declaration, which was triggered by a public speech 
made a month earlier by a left-lenient scholar-monk, Walpola Rahula, in 
response to a criticism by the first future Prime Minister of the country, D.S. 
Senanayake, who attacked such monks for appearing on the campaign 
platforms of Trotskyites and Communists, could be viewed as a fatwa from the 
Sangha sanctifying active participation of Buddhist monks in politics.  The 
declaration that was drafted by another scholar-monk, Yakkaduwa Sri 
Pragnarama Nayaka Thera, and was approved by the Board of teachers of the 
Privena included the following paragraph in the final document: 
We believe that politics have embraced all 
fields of human activity directed towards the 
public weal. No one will dispute that the work 
of the promotion of the religion is the duty of 
the Bhikkhus. It is clear that the welfare of the 
religion depends on the welfare of the people 
who profess that religion. History bears 
evidence to the fact that whenever the 
Sinhalese nation which was essentially a 
Buddhist nation was prosperous, Buddhism 
also flourished. We therefore declare that it is 
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nothing but fitting for Buddhists (Bhikkus?) to 
identify themselves ... (in) activities conducive 
to the welfare of our people whether these 
activities can be labelled politics or not, as 
long as they do not constitute an impediment 
to the religious life of Bhikkus. (Emphasis 
added.)  
The emphatic assertion that Sri Lanka is ‘essentially a Buddhist nation’ and that 
the Buddhist monks should ‘identify themselves’ with political activities, paved 
the way for the entry of militant ‘political monks’ into national political arena 
after the 1970s. It is this militancy coinciding with the rise of an Islamic 
orthodoxy and an open economy that is now endangering Sinhalese-Muslim 
amity. 
Political Buddhism with its minority militant offshoot became particularly 
active after the introduction of the open economy in the 1980s, the materialist 
face of President Jayewardena’s dharmista (righteous) society. Open 
economies with unregulated markets create economic inequities everywhere, 
and even in 1915 it was the economic disparity engendered by commercial 
capitalism that led the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists to target their attack on 
Muslim business community.  Once again, a similar scenario was on the making 
in the 1980s. The unrestrained opportunities opened for free enterprise and 
market competition in the Jayewardena era reinvigorated the commercial 
traits of several ethnic groups including the Muslims that were forced to lie 
subdued under the Socialist programs of the previous left-coalition. In the 
open economy environment of the 1980s which continues till now, the drive 
for competitive economic advantage invariably translated itself into a contest 
for business supremacy among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese bourgeoisie. 
Of the three, it was the ubiquitous presence of Muslim enterprises in the 
Sinhalese areas that became a source of envy and irritation to Sinhalese-
Buddhist chauvinists. Even the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), founded by a 
group of Sinhalese-Buddhist youth in the 1960s as a class conscious Marxist 
revolutionary movement, in spite of its initial revolutionary slogans and 
internationalism, later became captive to the prevailing ultra-nationalist and 
chauvinist Buddhist tendencies. The JVP recruited young Buddhist monks and 
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organised economic boycott campaigns demanding the Sinhalese consumers 
not to patronize Muslim shops and businesses. Such anti-Muslim attitude was 
also expressed with subtlety by an eminent Buddhist academic, Ediriweera 
Sarachchandra, in his criticism of the open economy model of Jayewardena. In 
attacking the government’s economic policy Sarachchandra specifically 
highlighted the indignity of exporting Sinhalese female labour to Muslim 
Middle East (Ediriweera Sarachchandra, 1982). When the President held an All-
Party Conference to resolve the Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic issue politically, instead 
of opting for a military solution as urged by sections of the Sangha, radical 
monks like Labuduwe Siridhamma, Maduluwawe Sobhita and Walpola Rahula 
joined forces to rally the Sinhalese masses against the government. According 
to Ananda Abeysekara, Rahula declared that the Sangha was ready to lay down 
their lives and that if peaceful avenues did not work, another “weapon” would 
be used to wage a battle all over the country. Sobhita later identified that 
weapon as the monks’ sacrifice of their own lives (Abeysekara, 2001). The 
Buddhist clergy, at least some sections of it, was obviously becoming militant. 
In the years that followed it was this militancy of a chauvinist Buddhist 
minority that fuelled anti-Muslim protests and violence.        
Muslim Politics and Political Buddhism 
The local Muslim elite in Sri Lanka learnt a bitter lesson from the 1915 episode. 
When the Coast Moors came under attack from the Sinhalese mob, some 
members of the elite, in the name of Islamic brotherhood, identified 
themselves with their Indian counterpart, even though Muslim businesses 
belonged to Ceylon Moors also suffered at the hands of their Indian brethren. 
One Muslim leader who openly expressed his reservation against this Islamic 
identity was Razik Freed (1893-1984), who was an eyewitness to the 1915 
tragedy and who was to dominate Sri Lankan Muslim politics until 1960. He 
demonstrated his disapproval in 1948, when the Ceylon Citizenship Bill came 
for debate in the Senate. On the day of the debate, 14 September, Razik, who 
was to emplane that afternoon for his pilgrimage to Mecca, made his hurried 
presence in the Senate and spoke, “we, the Ceylon Moors have suffered most 
in the past for want of a Citizenship Bill. We ... have been treated very badly by 
certain people, under the guise of Muslim brotherhood. We have, very 
unfortunately, played ourselves into the hands of other people” (Hansard, 
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1948). He was more specific in his allegation when he delivered another 
speech later that year. “The Ceylon Moors” he said, “had a flourishing trade in 
main street Pettah barely 40 years ago; but today you find the whole of the 
trade in Pettah, in the hands of non-Ceylon traders” (Hansard, 1948).  Razik’s 
ethnic parochialism also set the tone for future parliamentary strategy of 
Muslim leaders in navigating through the confrontational Sinhalese-Tamil 
ethno-nationalisms.  
With ethnic politics driving a wedge between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
communities from the 1950s Muslim leaders showed “gradual acceptance of a 
polity dominated by the Sinhalese and a reluctance to be assimilated within 
the larger Tamil-speaking community” (Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p. 145). This 
strategy was later translated almost into an electioneering slogan by another 
prominent Muslim leader when he said, “divided they are, we swim; united 
they are, we sink”. Sometimes described as pragmatic politics this strategy 
undoubtedly yielded several benefits to the Muslim community. The years 
from 1950s to the 1970s could be described as the honeymoon period of 
Muslim-Sinhalese relationship in independent Sri Lanka. Politically the 
community’s parliamentary representation, except in 1970, never failed to 
keep pace with its population strength. Even in electorates where the 
Sinhalese were in majority, like Galagedera and Akurana, a Muslim was able to 
win a parliamentary seat because of Sinhalese support. Practically in every 
ministerial cabinet Muslims were represented. Educationally, Government 
Muslim Schools were opened in all provinces which operated on a religiously 
determined school calendar different from the national school calendar. These 
schools were staffed by Muslim teachers most of whom were trained in 
exclusive Muslim Teachers Training Colleges. These schools are supervised by 
Muslim Inspectors and administered by a Muslim Director of Education. 
Culturally, Islamic holy days were declared public holidays; Muslims were 
allocated exclusive hours to broadcast Islamic programs over Radio Ceylon; 
Muslim public servants were allowed to take extended lunch-breaks on Fridays 
to attend Jumm’a prayers; a Wakf Board was established to manage all the 
mosques in the island; and Kazi religious courts were created for Muslims to 
deal with Muslim marriage and divorce issues on the basis of shariah laws.  
Economically also, at least until a Socialist Government came to power in 1970, 
the open economy allowed Muslim businessmen to thrive without much 
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restraint (Ali, 1986, O’Sullivan, 1997). The fact that all this were achieved by 
Muslims without a political party of their own and that it was the ethnic rivalry 
between the Sinhalese and Tamils that made these achievements easier to get 
were factors that the current Muslim leadership fails to understand and 
acknowledge. 
This strategy of aligning with the ruling governments to harvest transient 
benefits did not change even after forming in 1985 the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC), an ethnic Muslim political party “pledged to follow the Quran 
and the Sunnah”(Imtiyaz, 2012). Its founder, M.H. M. Ashraff, like his 
predecessors, Razik in 1950s and Badiuddin Mahmud in 1960s and 1970s 
continued to play the hackneyed game of identity politics, perhaps more 
openly and aggressively than before.  Ashraff, under the Chandrika 
Kumaratunga Government and Presidency became the Minister of Ports 
Development and Reconstruction. Like the Ministry of Education under 
Mahmud which “became at once a political base and a fountain of patronage” 
(de Silva, 1981, p. 552) Ashraff’s ministry also functioned as a virtual 
employment exchange at least for the Muslims of the South-East.  One of his 
outstanding achievements was the establishment of the South-Eastern 
University of Sri Lanka in Oluvil, a predominantly Muslim area, in 1995.  Once 
again, it was the angry LTTE reaction to Muslim alliance with the government 
that manifested through student harassment of Muslim undergraduates in the 
universities of Jaffna and Batticaloa that enabled Ashraff to plead for and get 
cabinet approval to establish the South-Eastern University.      
The Tamil anger against the Muslim-Sinhalese political alliance exploded into 
open and brutal violence against the Muslims when the LTTE took control of Sri 
Lankan Tamil’s political destiny. While on the one hand the concentration of 
almost one-third of the Muslim population in the north and east of the island, 
who identified themselves as Muslims and not Tamils, hollowed LTTE’s claim of 
a contiguous Tamil territory, the support of these Muslims to the Sinhalese 
governments on the other portrayed them as a fifth column and betrayers to 
the cause of Tamil Eelam.  Consequently, the LTTE unleashed some of its worst 
attacks on Muslims and expelled the entire Muslim population from Jaffna and 
Mannar districts in 1990 (Imtiyaz, 2005). It is reasonable to surmise that had 
the LTTE remained undefeated and in control of the North and in parts of the 
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East, Muslims would have continued to win the support and sympathy of the 
Sinhalese majority governments. The military defeat of the LTTE in 2008 
however, and the total annihilation of its leadership has unfortunately 
deprived Muslim politicians of an important bargaining chip. The past strategy 
of aligning with the Sinhalese governments to gain benefits at the expense of 
Tamils now seems to have passed its use by date.   
Deteriorating Sinhalese Muslim Relations 
Even during the honeymoon period Muslim leaders, because of their political 
obsequiousness to the governments in power, could not prevent injustices 
suffered by sections of their own community as a result of policies 
implemented by governments they supported. For instance, when the Ampara 
Sugarcane Project was implemented in the Eastern Province in the 1960s 
Muslim farmers lost without compensation thousands of acres of paddy lands 
that were traditionally owned and cultivated by them when those lands were 
acquired by the government. Later, in the 1980s, the Dighawapi Buddhist 
Sacred Area Project swallowed more Muslim lands again without adequate 
compensation. The International Crisis Group in its Asia Report No. 134 of May 
2007 has recorded more recent complaints from Muslims in the East about 
Sinhalese land encroachment in Muslim areas. When the Tamils agitated in the 
sixties and seventies against Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas Muslim 
leaders were caught in a catch-22 situation and remained silent. It is sad that 
the Muslim dimension of Sinhalization escaped even the attention of The 
Social Architects’ “Salt on Old Wounds: The Systematic Sinhalization of Sri 
Lanka’s North, East and Hill Country” (1912). 
Under the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)-Left United Front Coalition 
Government of Srimavo Bandaranaike the establishment of the State Trading 
Corporation, the State Gem Corporation, Cooperative Wholesale 
Establishment, and the enactment of the Paddy Lands Bill, all 
disproportionately and adversely affected Muslim businessmen and land 
owners. A number of Muslim business premises and residences were raided by 
the police and tax officials for alleged tax avoidance and financial 
misdemeanours. “While Muslims were displaced from their traditional niches, 
state legislation and nationalisation policies provided opportunities for 
Sinhalese to enter trade and commerce, two areas in which they had 
16 
 
previously had little involvement” (O’Sullivan, 1997). Even Badiuddin Mahmud, 
a founder member of the SLFP, the leader of the Islamic Socialist Front (ISF), 
and the Minister of Education in the coalition government, was powerless to 
stop any of the economic injustices. Perhaps as a response to these losses 
Mahmud quite brazenly used his influence with the Prime Minister and the 
power of his ministry to provide employment to all educated Muslim youth. 
This led to a backlash from Sinhalese chauvinists. By 1973 anti-Muslim 
sentiment was kindled among the Sinhalese which culminated in sporadic 
clashes between the two communities in various parts of the island, and the 
worst incident happened in 1976 in Puttalam, an ancient Muslim town in the 
North-West of the island, in which 271 Muslim families lost their homes, 44 
shops were looted and burnt and 18 Muslims were shot inside a mosque by 
the police. Seven of those shot were fatally wounded (A.S.M. Anas et al, 2008, 
p.55).   
When the United National Party (UNP) under J.R. Jayawardena captured power 
in 1977 its first task was to introduce a new constitution which did away with 
the Westminster model of parliamentary government and introduced a hybrid 
presidential system borrowed from the French and American models. One of 
the objectives of this constitution was to deprive the influence of minorities 
especially that of the Muslims in deciding the winners in general elections. A.J. 
Wilson, a prominent political scientist, reckoned that in about 20 to 22 percent 
of the electorates under the Westminster model Muslim votes would decide 
the winner if the contest between candidates was to be close (A.J. Wilson, 
1975, p.175). “The landslide victory of the U.N.P and the constitutional 
changes that followed should therefore be viewed as steps intended to free 
the U.N.P and even the S.L.F.P in future from any dependence on minority 
support” (Ali, 1986). It was the new constitution with its scheme of 
proportional representation that paved the way for some Muslims to form a 
political party of their own, the SLMC.  
In the general elections of 1993 when the SLFP won with a slender majority 
SLMC’s support became crucial to form a government. The election results 
demonstrated clearly the failure of Jayewardena’s objective of marginalising 
Muslim influence. The leader of the SLMC, Ashraff, publicly trumpeted, with an 
element of truth, that it was he and his party that was responsible for the 
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formation of the Chandrika Kumaratunga Government. This flamboyant 
braggadocio inflamed anti-Muslim feelings among the Sinhalese, which was 
further aggravated in 1999 when Ahraff challenged and engaged in a television 
debate with Gangodawila Somarama Thera, who considered the Muslims a 
threat to Sri Lanka. Although the debate was a “setback for the popular 
Buddhist monk” (Dewasiri, 2012) it deepened the bitterness of some sections 
of Buddhists towards Muslims. In 2001, a major clash broke out in Mawanella, 
a town along the Colombo-Kandy Road, which spread to its suburban villages 
causing considerable losses to Muslim lives and property. At least one mosque 
was incinerated in this episode (Anas et al, 2008). All in all, between the 1970s 
and until 2002, nearly 30 violent Muslim–Sinhalese clashes have been 
recorded and in a number of them Buddhist monks had played a leading role 
(M. S. M. Anas et al, 2008). Sporadic violence continued to occur thereafter 
and the anti-Muslim rally in Dambulla in April 2012, which was “meticulously 
planned” (Hussain, 2012) and operated by radical monks who demanded the 
closure of a mosque in that town, was one of the more recent of such 
incidents.       
The current United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) regime which actually 
commenced in 2005 with the victory of Mahinda Rajapakse as the new 
President of the country for a six year term and continuing until now after his 
re-election in 2010, has accommodated a number of ultra-Buddhist elements 
in a grand coalition, which includes the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) or the 
National Freedom Front established by Buddhist monks in 2004. From the 
Vidyalankara Privena Declaration in 1946 to the formation of JHU in 2004 
political Buddhism has had a robust growth with the support of the ruling 
governments. Along with its growth militant Buddhism has also dovetailed 
spitting venom against the Muslims and other minorities. A mood of 
triumphalism in the wake of the 2009 victory over the LTTE has hardened the 
militants’ antipathy towards all minorities in the country. Like the JVP before, 
the JHU now is also engaged in protracted campaign against Muslim business 
interests. The call to boycott Muslim shops by Sinhalese consumers and urging 
the Sinhalese not to sell land or property to Muslims is a constant theme in this 
campaign. The emergence of “several new middle class social layers” amongst 
the Buddhists and an upsurge of “extreme Buddhist nationalism”, as Dewasiri 
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maintains, have combined to jeopardise Sinhalese-Muslim relations in the 21st 
century Sri Lanka (Dewasiri, 2012). 
Islamic Orthodoxy: Growth and Implications                                        
Victor C. de Munk’s provocative statement that “most Sri Lankan Muslims do 
not perceive themselves as full citizens of the Sri Lankan nation as it is 
presently formulated” (de Munk, 1998) requires serious consideration in the 
context of the current Sinhalese-Bhuddhist-Muslim tensions. Obeyasekere’s 
equation, “Sri Lanka=Sinhala=Buddhism”, which Munk quotes, virtually 
excludes all ethnic or religious minorities from full citizenship and equal status. 
The 1972 Republican constitution introduced by the SLFP-Left Coalition not 
only removed the safeguards accorded to minorities under Section (29) 2 of 
the 1946 Soulbury Costitution but also elevated Buddhism to special status 
within the polity.  With ‘Sinhalese Only’ as the official language and Buddhism 
as religion with special status, the Tamils saw the writings on the wall that their 
language and culture being demoted constitutionally. They took up the fight to 
redress this imbalance, which ultimately led them to demand a separate state, 
culminating in a civil war that ended in military defeat. The Muslim community 
on the other hand, as observed earlier, did not have anything to do with the 
Tamil struggle and continued to align themselves with the Sinhalese majority.  
One of the reasons for this nonchalance, apart from politics of pragmatism, 
was the switch from the ‘racial’ Moor identity to the religious Muslim identity 
after the 1970s. This new identity which was chosen as a convenient tool to 
demonstrate Muslim neutrality in the raging Sinhalese-Tamil armed 
confrontation promoted the growth of religious consciousness within the 
community and made umma Islamiyya or Islamic community and not the 
nation of Sri Lanka the primary entity of allegiance. The periodic switch of 
identity by the Muslim elite from Moor to Ceylon Moor and to Muslim 
reinforces Ismail’s argument that identities are “fluid, transient, always in flux, 
never permanent; and ... they alter ... precisely because they are constructs” 
(Ismail Q 1995, italics in the original). However, unlike his claim that the switch 
is always made in the interest of the elite, the one from Ceylon Moor to 
Muslim was made at the grass root level rather than at the elite level owing to 
the evangelical endeavour of Muslim missionary movements as will be shown 
below.      
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The concept of umma Islamiyya refers to the collectivity of believers in Islam of 
all nations who consider the Islamic shariah as the guiding principle and 
philosophy of any political entity. This universal religious community which 
exists more in the believers’ imagination than in reality is found spread within 
three regions as delineated by the classical Muslim jurists: those who live in 
dharul Islam (the abode of peace) where Muslim rule prevails; those who live 
entrapped in dharul harb (the abode of war) where Muslims dwell under 
oppressive non-Muslim rule like in 16th century Spain under Christian 
monarchs; and those who live in dharul sulh (the abode of truce) where 
Muslims live in peace with freedom to practice their religion while owing civic 
allegiance to the country in which they live. The history of Islam and Buddhist 
tolerance of Muslims in Sri Lanka unequivocally places the Muslim community 
in the last category. Until the last quarter of the of the 20th century Buddhist-
Muslim relations rarely faced any tension on religious grounds, even though it 
was a Buddhist religious procession that provided the immediate trigger for 
the 1915 riots; but that is now a distant memory. However, certain 
developments in the last three or four decades as pointed out earlier have 
created once again an environment of tension between the two communities. 
A fresh wave of ultra-Islamic orthodoxy appears to be in clash with political 
Buddhism and its minority militant offshoot. Before exploring Munk’s 
contention further some aspects of this orthodoxy and its growth in Sri Lanka 
need addressing.    
The open economy of the 1980s in Sri Lanka ushered in at a time when a new 
wave of Islamic awakening was sweeping across the Muslim Middle East. The 
emergence of the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) as price setter of petroleum, which flooded the coffers of the OAPEC 
(Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations with countless 
amount of petro-dollars; the success of the Iranian “Islamicized” ( Dabashi H, 
2012: 40) revolution in 1979 which, although was a shia minority 
phenomenon, yet, sent a strong message to the sunni majority that worldwide 
Islamic rule was not far away; and, the successful participation of Al-Qaida and 
the Mujahideen in the American led war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan: 
all these developments culminated in an umma-wide Islamic euphoria that the 
world had never witnessed before.  Islam arrived at the centre stage of world 
politics and dialogue, and the Muslims believed that Islam is the final solution 
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to a world in turmoil. The economic affluence of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states on the one hand and the ascendancy of political Islam on the other 
began to impact Muslim minorities the world over, both materially as well as 
spiritually. Sri Lanka was no exception to this phenomenon. 
On the material side, employment opportunities that opened up in the Middle 
East attracted hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans - Muslims and non-
Muslims, males and females, and skilled and unskilled – in search of lucrative 
jobs with better pay. One category of such jobs was housemaids. While the 
remittances of these expatriates were a handy source of income to their 
families in Sri Lanka and added to the stock of foreign exchange of a cash-
strapped government (in 1997 for instance the total remittances amounted to 
$1 billion which outweighed the trade deficit of $0.7 billion), evidence of 
oppressive working conditions and mistreatment of housemaids by Arab 
landlords led to open criticism by Buddhist nationalists. Scholars like 
Sarachchandra, as pointed out earlier, condemned the government policy of 
exporting labour, especially Sinhalese housemaids, to Muslim Middle East. On 
this issue however, Sarachchandra was only echoing a criticism levelled already 
in the fifties by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the founding father of the SLFP, at 
affluent local Muslims employing in their homes Sinhalese women as 
housemaids (Lebbe, 1980).  
Another material benefit enjoyed especially by the Muslims had a spiritual side 
to it. The local Muslim community became a favoured beneficiary of Arab 
charity from the 1980s. While Sri Lankan products like tea and precious stones 
found a ready market in Muslim Middle East, which increased the country’s 
national income (close to 50 percent of Sri Lankan tea goes even now to 
Muslim countries), Arab public and private charity flowed back into the Muslim 
community in the form of financial assistance to build mosques, madrasas, and 
other Muslim religious and cultural institutions. Even local Muslims employed 
in the Middle East donated generously to those projects. Muslims, in general, 
have a penchant towards building mosques and the imams never stopped 
stressing in their sermons the heavenly reward waiting for those who build a 
‘House for Allah’ in this world. As a result of external assistance and internal 
collections new mosques were built and old ones were renovated and 
enlarged, and according to the Sri Lankan Wakf Board website there are at 
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least 1,816 mosques of varying sizes in the country. The actual number should 
be more than that because not all mosques are registered with the Wakf 
Board. In recent years however, a number of these mosques and madrasas 
have become a source of Buddhist-Muslim tension.  
Unlike the Buddhist vihares, Christian churches and Hindu temples, Muslim 
mosques have to be internally spacious to accommodate hundreds of 
worshippers every day. Also, unlike in other religions, praying five times a day 
is obligatory to all Muslims. Praying in congregation, preferably in a mosque 
led by an imam, is taught to be more meritorious than praying in isolation at 
one’s home or elsewhere. On Friday noon every week, for thirty nights during 
the fasting month of Ramadhan, and in the mornings of the two festival days, 
the congregation of worshippers would swell to thousands. In the early days of 
Islam the mosque operated not only as a place of worship but also as a centre 
of learning and communal assemblies. It continues to perform these functions 
even now. This means the mosque premise is an intensely utilised spot and is 
never left un-attended. The Prophet of Islam innovated a unique way of 
reminding Muslims about prayer times, by vocally calling them through a 
specific recitation in Arabic, the adhan. This recitation continues unaltered to 
this day and could be heard at least five times a day wherever Muslims live. 
Tradition has made it meritorious for Muslims to live close to a mosque so that 
they could hear the voice of adhan. However, in plural societies like Sri Lanka 
where people of different faiths and of philosophical persuasion live as 
neighbours, and with increased urbanization and noise pollution, this voice is 
not always audible unless a loudspeaker is used. It is the use of this piece of 
technology especially for the pre-dawn prayer that has caused problem. That 
particular adhan disturbed everyone’s sleep. Some aggressive Buddhists 
reacted to this disturbance in a tit-for-tat manner by playing over 
loudspeakers, even before the Muslim pre-dawn prayer time, taped versions of 
Buddhist chanting. The issue over this cacophony of competing religious noises 
went before the Supreme Court which delivered its verdict on 9 November 
2007 disallowing the use of loudspeakers that caused “annoyance, 
disturbance, and harm” to other parties (CIMOGG, 2007).  
Construction of mosques without approval from the state or its local governing 
authorities and without conforming to the national architectural environment 
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of the country is a burning issue in most Western countries.  Behind this issue 
is the fundamental fear of several European countries about Muslim “political 
will to take power” and establish Shariah law (New York Times, 2009). The 
controversy over the minarets in Switzerland is well known and even in 
Australia the Department of Town Planning is quite scrupulous in approving 
applications for building mosques. In Sri Lanka the Muslims never threatened 
to take control of political power nor are they craving for the implementation 
of Shariah law on a national scale. However, to the Sinhala-Buddhist political 
monks and their followers, who view Sri Lanka as the land of dhammadipa or 
the land of the righteous, the mosques, churches, and even Hindu temples 
have become icons of the unrighteous. It is this religiously manufactured fear 
that has led to protests against mosques and madrasas. 
The Muslim code of dress has also become controversial in recent decades. 
The traditional sarong, shirt, jacket, and Fez cap for males, and sari, blouse, 
and mukkadu (the top piece of the sari thrown over the head) for females, are 
gradually being replaced with a mixture of north-Indian or Pakistani and 
Arabian attire for both men and women. The long black gown with a black 
niqab or veil that covers the face with a small opening for the eyes is entirely a 
recent introduction into the sartorial designs of Muslim women in Sri Lanka. I 
have already dealt with the historical genesis and religious aspects of burqa 
and niqab in another context (Ali, 2010a).  
The mushrooming of mosques and madrasas, the call for prayer over 
loudspeakers, and the changing Muslim attire are all related to a rising brand 
of Islamic orthodoxy after the 1970s.  There are two Islamic movements in Sri 
Lanka that have promoted this orthodoxy. One is the Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) 
whose origins go back to pre-independence India. It is a missionary movement 
whose chief objective is Islamization of Muslims rather than converting non-
Muslims to Islam (Ali, A. 2006). Indian missionaries of TJ frequented Sri Lanka 
from the 1950s and today the number of its local foot-soldiers has grown to 
hundreds of thousands. TJ is a non-aggressive and moderate religious 
movement that shuns any political involvement or affiliation. In fact, it 
preaches minimum attachment to the affairs of this world and maximum 
devotion to matters of the Hereafter. Its disinterestedness in more mundane 
and national issues is a concern to all governments. As Ziauddin Sardar, a 
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prolific writer on Muslim affairs, found out from his experience with TJ, they 
“neither offered nor considered they had to do anything particular about 
rampant injustice, the horrors of suffering and neglect that formed the 
circumstances and deformed so many lives in country after country, the 
Muslim world especially” (Sardar Z, 2004, p. 12).  
The second movement, Wahhabi or Wahhabism, is of a more recent origin 
arriving from Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism takes its name from its founder 
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) and is aggressively orthodox in its 
approach to the tenets of Islam. It does not tolerate any deviation from its 
strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and the sunnah (sayings and 
practices of the Prophet), and is anti-shia, anti-sufi, and anti-other religions. 
Wahhabism is the official ideology of Saudi Arabia and the spread of 
Wahhabism is part of the program in Saudi Arabia’s contest for worldwide 
Islamic leadership. The mosques, madrasas and cultural associations that 
receive financial assistance from the Saudi Government invariably become 
Wahhabi agents of religious change. Wahhabism in recent decades has 
become a social disequilibrator in several Muslim and non-Muslim countries. In 
Sri Lanka, Wahhabi-induced religious factionalism among Muslims has even led 
to death and destruction, as happened in 2006 in Kattankudy, an urban Muslim 
settlement in the Eastern Province (Ali, A. 2009).                               
To both, TJ and Wahhabism, the umma Islamiyya is the primary unit of 
affiliation and allegiance, and therefore, owing an equilvalent  allegiance to a 
politically constructed nation state unless that state is a Muslim one weakens 
the strength of umma Islamiyya. If so, what are the rights and obligations of 
Muslims in a non-Muslim nation state? The shariah has no direct answer to 
this question, because the entire corpus of the shariah was designed and 
compiled at a time when Muslims were in political power. It spells out the 
details of how a Muslim state should treat non-Muslims living in its midst but 
does not tell how Muslims should live in a non-Muslim state. Fiqh al-aqalliyat 
al-muslima (jurisprudence of Muslim minorities) pioneered by scholars like 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Qaradawi, 2001) is currently in its nascent stage and yet to 




In many parts of the world where Muslims live as minorities they live in 
“parallel societies” as argued by Tibi (2008).  The Muslim preference to build 
parallel societies is perhaps the legacy of the Convivencia model that prevailed 
in Muslim Spain where each ethnic or religious community was allowed to live 
in virtual exclusion governed by its own religious laws (Ali 2010b).  In Sri Lanka 
also this exclusivist trend is noticeable. Imtiyaz’s contention that Islamic 
fundamentalism in Sri Lanka is a “by-product of state’s cultural and socio-
economic concessions in the 70s and 80s to the Muslim elites to win Muslim 
support” and “provided a solid platform for the recent growth of Islamic 
exclusivism” provides a convenient platform (Imtiyaz ARM, op.cit.) to discuss 
this new development and Munk’s statement cited above. Even if 
Obeyesekere’s equation be reformulated to read as Sri Lanka = Ethnic + 
Religious Pluralism, the question arises as to what is the nature and extent of 
Muslims’ commitment to the country in which they live? Are they Muslims in 
Sri Lanka or of Sri Lanka? To put it differently, are they Muslim Sri Lankans or 
Sri Lankan Muslims? The difference between the two questions in each set is 
not semantic or superficial but substantive and of far reaching implication. To 
the Muslim fundamentalists, who look to umma Islamiyya as the primary unit 
of allegiance they are Muslims in and not of Sri Lanka. In their perception, the 
transient attachment to this world and relentless yearning towards the 
Hereafter makes citizenship an ambivalent concept to say the least. However, 
it should be stressed that commitment to umma Islamiyya does not imply any 
extraterritorial allegiance. It simply means that the fundamentalists are not 
typically interested in national political and other mundane issues. Andrew 
March’s (2009) search for overlapping consensus between liberal citizenship 
and Islamic shariah is a fascinating study that can provides a compromise 
solution to this crucial debate.  
For the present purpose, an ideologically constructed claim by the militant 
Buddhists that Sri Lanka belongs solely to the Sinhalese-Buddhists and that the 
others could live only at the behest of the Sinhalese and as second grade 
citizens, is directly at loggerhead with the Muslim fundamentalist perception 
that Muslims in Sri Lanka are a part of a universal umma whose rights and 
obligations are religiously determined and lie outside the dictates of a 
politically constructed Buddhist entity. While the militant Buddhists are keen in 
Buddhisizing Sri Lanka, as noted recently by the Director of the Catholic 
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Diocese of Jaffna (2012), the Muslim fundamentalists are keen in Islamizing the 
Muslims with umma-Islamiyya consciousness.  According to Senewiratne, a 
Sinhalese human rights activist, the issue of Buddhisization of the “multiethnic, 
multireligious, multicultural, multilingual Sri Lanka ... is not an opinion to be 
debated, but a fact to be faced” (2012, p. 7). Obviously, when the citizenship 
rights of minorities are devalued because of the majority’s aggrandizing 
political behaviour, minorities are left with no alternative but to seek refuge in 
other forms of social formations. Thus, the Muslims’ identity with umma-
Islamiyya cannot be treated entirely as a religious choice without considering 
its potential political implication.    
Be that as it may, this fundamental contradiction between the goals of political 
Buddhism and Islamic fundamentalism is currently being exploited by an open-
economy-generated Sinhalese-Buddhist bourgeoisie to gain economic mileage 
over the Muslim businessmen; and it is this toxic mix that lies at the heart of 
recent Sinhalese-Muslim disturbances. An open economy always creates 
inequities if not regulated; but that regulation must be rational in objective 
and neutral in implementation. The current political regime in Sri Lanka with its 
alliance with JHU and ultra-nationalists does not seem to have either the 
capacity or willingness to tackle this issue.         
With the Tamil ethnic problem still remaining unresolved, more than three 
years after the end of the civil war, opening a second front to fight the Muslim 
community will only impact the country’s international image even more 
negatively. When the Dambulla mosque incident took place in April 2012 the 
Muslims of Tamil Nadu went on a protest march to express their anger, and 
several foreign Muslim diplomats in Colombo also raised their concern with 
the government. Sri Lanka’s dependence on the Arab market for tea exports 
and for employment opportunities for more than one million of its citizens is a 
compelling reason why the government should be sensitive to anti-Muslim 
cries at home. Even in the United Nations Sri Lanka carries considerable 
support from Muslim countries as demonstrated recently over the March 2012 
resolution on war crimes. Similarly, the fifty-six member Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) is an international block of Muslim nations whose 
opinion on Muslim issues carries considerable weight internationally. The 
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umma Islamiyya consciousness of the Sri Lankan Muslims, in spite of its 
shortcomings, has obvious geo-political implications.                      
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